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ABSTRACT 
We examine the cooperative production of corporate governance. 
We explain that this production does not occur exclusively within a 
“team” or “firm.” Rather, several aspects of corporate governance are 
quintessentially market products. Like Blair and Stout, we view the 
shareholder as but one of many stakeholders in a corporation. Where we 
depart from their analysis is in our view of the boundaries of a firm. We 
suggest that they overweight the intrafirm production of control. Focus-
ing on the primacy of a board of directors, Blair and Stout posit a hier-
archical team that governs the economic enterprise. We observe, howev-
er, that for many of the most important governance decisions there is, in 
fact, no hierarchy. In those cases, governance emerges from an inter-
twined series of market transactions. To use the nomenclature of Blair 
and Stout, there are many players, but there is no coach, and thus, no 
“team.” Rather, the firm is controlled by a series of relationships—some 
of which are governed within the firm and some of which are governed 
and enforced externally. Ours, then, is a true Coasean framework, sug-
gesting that important implications arise when we differentiate cases 
where the value of market discipline on stakeholders exceeds the large 
transaction costs that could be reduced by integration or team creation 
from cases where the opposite is true. We provide some preliminary con-
clusions on those implications.   
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“Yet having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by 
price movements, production could be carried on without any or-
ganization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?” 
-Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The scholarly debate about corporate governance is stuck in a rut. 
The root of the problem is the excessive focus on the board of directors, 
either as the mediator between the interests of ownership and control, as 
the coach of a corporate team, or as an obstacle to the will of a broad col-
lection of stakeholders.2 Most theories to date either extol or decry the 
role and importance of shareholders (broadly thought of as “owners”) 
within the board-dominated firm hierarchy. These theories approach the 
problem with different operating assumptions about whether the firm is 
premised on team production, property rights, or something else. But 
they generally end in one of two places: a discussion of how the board 
facilitates optimal governance or how it should get out of the way of ad-
equate corporate reform. The goal of our project is to get the scholarly 
debate out of this rut by examining how recent corporate practices illu-
minate a different locus of corporate governance. Only if we understand 
where corporate governance truly resides are we able to effectively regu-
late corporate activity. 
We start with Ronald Coase’s insight that cooperation in the pro-
duction of a good or service can happen in many ways, not all of which 
happen inside of a firm or even on a team.3 Coase’s famous question—
“why is there any organization?”—made this point salient.4 The bounda-
                                                 
 1. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937). 
 2. Compare Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783 
(2011) [hereinafter Alces, Beyond the Board]; Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary 
Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239 (2009); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Pow-
er: Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. Rev. 833 (2005); Marga-
ret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 
(1999). 
 3. Coase, supra note 1, at 388. 
 4. Id. Think about the production of an automobile. A young Henry Ford might assemble one 
from pieces bought entirely from a variety of suppliers, or an older Henry Ford might create a firm—
the Ford Motor Company—that would own the entire supply chain, from mining to steel and rubber 
production to engineering, assembly, and distribution. There are an infinite number of alternatives 
between these two extremes. A middle-aged Henry Ford might do some of the work under the auspi-
ces of the Ford Motor Company, but buy engines from two brothers named Dodge. As market trans-
actions become less costly, one could imagine examples that are more unusual: the end user could 
contract with dozens of market actors to produce each part and then dozens more to assemble them. 
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ry of the firm, he reasoned, is defined by the relative costs and benefits of 
organizing activity by fiat (that is, within a firm) or by market transac-
tion.5 The question for Coase and those who followed has always been: 
why do some productions follow the first model while others follow the 
second?6 Our key contribution is to demonstrate that Coase’s insight ap-
plies not only to the production of firm outputs, but also to the produc-
tion of corporate governance.7 
Governance, which we define as the locus and mechanisms of re-
sidual corporate control, is no different from the supply of other things to 
the firm.8 It can be produced within a firm or by external market forces, 
and the choice will depend on the relative costs and benefits of each ap-
proach. We would expect some firms, at some times, to “build” their 
own governance while other firms at other times “buy” governance in the 
market. This choice, which was the focus of Coase’s pioneering work, is 
plain in the production of goods and services. Apple Computer employ-
ees design the iPhone, but another company, Foxconn, builds them under 
contract with Apple. This is presumably because engaging Foxconn leads 
to a more efficient production.9 While outsourcing is well understood in 
this context, the concept is equally applicable for corporate governance. 
This is most obvious when a firm is in its early stages and contracts 
out governance to a group of venture capital funds or when a firm is un-
derperforming and does the same with a private equity fund. In both cas-
es, while there is still a board, and managers still run the firm, the real 
governance rights exist in a series of state-contingent contracts between 
the firm, its shareholders, and the investment funds. The contracts in both 
of these cases slice and dice control in sophisticated ways that presuma-
bly increase the value of the firm. As we explore below, in these and oth-
er related contexts, the board of directors—often thought of as the central 
node of control—is a bit player, if relevant at all. Real governance power 
lies elsewhere, and largely outside of the gaze of modern corporate law 
scholarship. 
                                                                                                             
In other words, in economic production, cooperation can result from command (“Hey you, build me 
an engine”) or from arm’s length market transactions (“We’d like to buy this engine from you”). 
 5. Id. at 388–89. 
 6. See id. at 389. A subsidiary question is how to differentiate the two in the first place. 
 7. By governance, we mean both a framework in which decisions about how a firm should be 
organized and operate are made, as well as the key decisions of the firm regarding certain actions, 
like compensation. 
 8. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corpo-
rate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2014). 
 9. The source of this efficiency is generally thought to arise from the information or discipline 
provided by the market. 
368 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:365 
More generally, much of corporate governance today is not “built” 
or housed within most firms, but rather emerges from the combination of 
inputs produced in an external “market of governance.” Stakeholders of 
all types exercise small bits of governance, and the whole of that govern-
ance exists in an indefinable space characterized more by market forces 
than command and control. If there is a suite of control rights that consti-
tutes governance, its production is divided among the board, senior lend-
ers, bond holders, venture capital firms, private equity firms, hedge funds, 
institutional investors, and the like. But that is not all. Additional suppli-
ers of governance may include unions and customers.10 All of these play-
ers exercise some set of the components that add up to the whole of cor-
porate governance. And despite the incompleteness of the contracting 
among the players, a centralized authority or organization rarely arises to 
coordinate them. Our hypothesis is that this lack of a central organization 
is a salutary result. It is the market production that Coase identified as an 
alternative to integration and merely reflects the costs and benefits of 
exercising governance power. 
We suggest, then, that the best way to view the governance of firms 
is as a product that investors and all other stakeholders desire. Like any 
product, this can be produced within a firm or in the market. Importantly, 
this choice is independent of the same choice about whether other as-
pects of firm activity happen inside or outside the firm. Governance for 
an automobile manufacturer can be entirely external while production of 
the automobile is fully integrated or vice versa.11 
In Part II below, we contrast this view to the existing accounts of 
firms and corporate governance. We then explore the common forms of 
governance over large firms of various types. Our preliminary analysis is 
that, while corporate governance is produced both inside and outside of a 
firm, the most important aspects—decisions about capital structure, long-
term goals, acquisitions, and mergers—often emerge from market trans-
actions. Internal governance decisions usually cover things in the catego-
ry of hiring, short-term production and marketing strategies, compensa-
tion, and the like. This draws into question laws and theories that elevate 
                                                 
 10. The role of outsiders was pointed out by Blair and Stout and has been examined by others. 
See generally Alces, Beyond the Board, supra note 2; Blair & Stout, supra note 2; Douglas G. Baird 
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1209 (2006); Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1309 (2008); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private 
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009). Our goal here is to work out the 
contours and implications of that role. 
 11. Tesla, in its early stages, might be an example of the former, while GM may be an example 
of the latter. 
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the primacy of the board of directors. Internal hierarchies that may be 
described as teams (Coase’s firm) might act in the direct production of 
the widgets that a corporation sells. But the governance structure for the 
firm is an organic network (Coase’s ideal market production) that leads 
to the production of corporate control. They are distinct modes of pro-
duction. 
In Part III, we provide a number of examples that demonstrate the 
phenomenon we are illuminating; specifically, corporate governance can 
take place through the external controls created by market production. 
These examples primarily demonstrate the way in which creditors exer-
cise control and handle problems of residual control using market-like 
mechanisms. 
In Part IV, we explore the implications this has for the law of cor-
porate governance and finance. For instance, the theory and practice that 
elevates the centrality of the board of directors, with attendant fiduciary 
duties, likely destroys value by limiting the ability of entrepreneurs and 
investors to contract in ways that narrowly tailor governance rights to 
optimize firm value. On the other side of the debate, attempts to curb 
board power by internalizing the market production of governance over 
the firm are equally misguided. 
II. CHALLENGING THE EXISTING THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE 
“My own favorite example is riverboat pulling in China before the 
communist regime, when a large group of workers marched along 
the shore towing a good sized wooden boat. The unique interest of 
this example is that the collaborators actually agreed to the hiring 
of a monitor to whip them.” 
-Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm12 
While decades have been spent analyzing theories of the firm and 
of corporate governance, much disagreement and confusion remains. 
One strand of literature examined the role and value of a manager in di-
recting team cooperation when market direction is costly or impossible.13 
Another strand, noting that theories of teams and hierarchies cannot ex-
plain the “firm” per se (as opposed to elaborate market arrangements), 
focused instead on property rights and the central ownership of assets as 
                                                 
 12. Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1983). 
 13. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in 
Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: 
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971). 
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the defining feature of the firm.14 Thus, Grossman, Hart, and Moore in-
troduced the idea of ownership of assets by one of the input providers 
(and the residual control rights that go along with that ownership) as the 
defining feature of a firm.15 Alchian and Demsetz,16 Holmstrom,17 and 
others18 focused more on the concept of a team that has deposited residu-
al control in a neutral leader. These theories were criticized in part for 
ignoring agency conflict between owners and managers.19 That critique 
obviously builds on the foundation of Berle and Means,20 and Jensen and 
Meckling.21 Still, others have simply viewed the firm as a nexus of con-
tracts where various input providers, from employees to sophisticated 
lenders, come together to create one large productive relationship. 22 
There is a general assumption in all of these works, however, that owners 
of the firm have, or should have, the power to define governance over the 
firm. 
An alternative proposed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout is to 
view the firm as an example of “team production,” with the board of di-
rectors serving as a “mediating hierarchy” that determines, calibrates, 
and cashes out the various interests of those who invest their assets in the 
firm. Blair and Stout summarize their idea as follows: 
[Our team production model] suggests that the legal requirement 
that public corporations be managed under the supervision of a 
board of directors has evolved not to reduce agency costs—indeed, 
such a requirement may exacerbate them—but to encourage the 
firm-specific investment essential to certain forms of team produc-
tion. In other words, boards exist not to protect shareholders per se, 
but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members 
                                                 
 14. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Owner-
ship: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John 
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). 
 15. See sources cited supra note 14. 
 16. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 13. 
 17. Holmstrom, supra note 13. 
 18. See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 387 (1998). 
 19. See generally Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Corporate Finance, the Theory of the 
Firm, and Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1998). 
 20. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1932). 
 21. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 22. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416 (1989). 
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of the corporate “team,” including shareholders, managers, rank and 
file employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors.23 
The “team,” in the Blair and Stout sense, is defined not by the pres-
ence of multiple stakeholders (or players), but rather by the existence and 
centrality of the board (or coach). The team production scholarship ar-
gues that incomplete-contracting problems in collaborative production 
can be addressed by appointing a third party who takes the lead when 
necessary to fill any contractual void.24 The other team members volun-
tarily relinquish residual control to their mighty coach,25 who in turn 
provides dispute resolution and other decisionmaking that mediates the 
interests of the various stakeholders in ways that maximize the value of 
the enterprise. To press the analogy from this Part’s epigraph, the various 
corporate stakeholders are like the riverboat pullers in China, and the 
board is the third party hired to whip them.26 
Blair and Stout rightly point out that concepts equating “ownership” 
and “control” do not quite work in the context of large public corpora-
tions.27 This bold claim was premised on the fact that few owners of 
business firms exercise or desire to exercise any meaningful govern-
ance.28 Once that point is recognized, the idea that theories of the firm 
ignore the agency problem between ownership and management be-
comes irrelevant. In this way, agency costs between the board and firm 
owners are a feature, not a bug of corporate law. These costs allow the 
board to pursue a number of things, including long-term value, values 
other than pure shareholder wealth maximization, and other socially val-
uable courses of action that may be sacrificed by the shareholder-
dominated firm. 
While we think Blair and Stout were correct in their critiques of 
theories of the firm that rely on the equivalency of ownership and con-
trol,29 we part ways with them for precisely the same reason they parted 
                                                 
 23. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 253 (emphasis added). 
 24. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 13; Holmstrom, supra note 13. 
 25. In most models, this captain cannot be an independent provider of inputs—think the coach 
on the sidelines rather than the quarterback in the huddle. This distinction is not central to our in-
quiry here. 
 26. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 27. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 260–61. 
 28. Id. (“If ‘control’ is the economically important feature of ‘ownership,’ then to build a theo-
ry of corporations on the premise that ownership (and, hence, control) lies with shareholders grossly 
mischaracterizes the legal realities of most public corporations.”). We think this point is broader and 
applies to most sophisticated firms with complex capital structures. 
 29. Blair and Stout are no longer alone on this. There has been an increasing trend of scholars 
moving away from the shareholder-centric view. Even the most strident defenders of shareholder 
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ways with the pre-1999 literature: modern corporate behavior does not fit 
well with their theory of residual control being exercised by a very pow-
erful board of directors. 
Corporate governance today increasingly emerges from the bits and 
pieces of power produced in an external market of governance. Fitting 
the capital structure of today’s sophisticated firms into the team model 
stretches the analogy too far. For instance, Blair and Stout suggested that 
perhaps creditors were within their team, meaning subject to the residual 
control of their coach, the board of directors.30 In Steven Cheung’s anal-
ogy, this would place them as riverboat pullers subject to the discipline 
of the whipping board. This placement gets things wrong. 
Lenders do not deposit residual control of much of anything in the 
board. Instead, they undertake one or more of the following strategies: 
they may demand covenants that, upon breach, allow them to accelerate 
debt in a way that shifts residual control away from the board, or they 
may provide only short-term debt so that the board must routinely come 
back to the loan market and subject itself to that market’s control.31 
When creditors use contract to acquire control rights, they create specific 
levers of governance that only they control—like veto power over debt-
to-income ratios or residual authority to decide on large capital expendi-
tures. When they rely on the market, the power is more diffuse and the 
guidance for firm managers may be less precise. But the residual authori-
ty of creditors is equally powerful. 
Creditors may supplement these mechanisms of governance by act-
ing through the board,32 or they may bypass it altogether, as we will see. 
The reality is that the board has some governance rights in some circum-
stances, senior lenders have governance rights in others, and various jun-
ior lenders have governance rights in all kinds of other circumstances. 
However they do it, this lever of control over governance through debt 
contract has only become salient to academics in the last decade.33  
                                                                                                             
primacy have begun to consider the importance of the interests of other stakeholders in certain con-
texts. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 
251 (2010). 
 30. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 253. 
 31. See Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993). 
 32. For example, they could take a board seat to get information. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip 
E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability, 62 J. FIN. 
ECON. 415 (2001). 
 33. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 10; Tung, supra note 10. Though, to be fair, Patrick 
Bolton and the likes of Saul Levmore and Barry Adler were certainly aware of it when they exam-
ined the tools of creditor monitoring. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Con-
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But our point goes deeper than just identifying lenders as monitors 
who are outside the total control of the board. While the existing litera-
ture has highlighted the relationship the lenders have with and over the 
firm, the next step is to dig into the relationship among creditors and ana-
lyze the relationships those creditors have with other external stakehold-
ers. All governance of modern corporations happens both inside and out-
side of the firm, as it is currently conceived. Like creditors, all stake-
holders sometimes are passive and sometimes exercise total control, as in 
the venture capital or private equity case. Other investors achieve similar 
control simply through their threats to buy and sell shares, as in the case 
of hedge funds. Individual funds or funds acting in groups (sometimes 
called “wolf packs”) can use purchases, or the threat of a purchase, or 
short sale as a means of exercising control. There is some evidence this 
indirect control has positive benefits for firm stakeholders.34 
A more expansive view of the market for corporate governance re-
veals not one team, but rather a collage of groups contracting on the 
market—some that are independent and others that are overlapping. We 
see governance as more evolving and organic than can fit into the rigid 
models of centralized corporate governance in the academic literature.35 
To see the larger point, consider that the agreements (both explicit 
and implicit) between and among creditors, as well as the background 
laws allocating the suite of control rights, are riddled with incomplete 
provisions and open questions. This makes governance a fertile ground 
for the emergence of a firm, or a team production model, through which 
production of governance would be managed. Yet no grand firm or team 
has emerged. Despite the incompleteness and diffusion of the monitoring 
and control of corporate conduct, governance remains largely determined 
by market forces rather than a powerful board. 
                                                                                                             
tracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992) (examining debt 
agreements as tools to induce profitable behavior); Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal 
Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1996) (modeling effects of loan 
terms on lowering strategic default incentives); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commer-
cial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Adler, supra note 31. 
 34. See generally Alon Brav et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism, 64 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 
45 (2008). 
 35. Our analysis here is similar to and draws inspiration from G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein 
& Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2000). They suggest that there are no 
firms and propose that the best analogy for a firm is a web of connected contracts. We think they are 
half right. The connected contracts theory is accurate if limited to the production of governance. But 
the Coasean notion of a hierarchy that organizes the production of the widget or automobile is still 
very much useful and should not be rejected. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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For instance, consider the case of a corporate borrower that defaults 
on a note, say by its debt-to-income ratio rising above a set limit in viola-
tion of a covenant.36 At that point, control of the firm is in flux and inde-
terminate. Even if the firm is performing well in real terms, the lender 
can call a technical default to extract rents. Equity and management can, 
however, respond with a threat of bankruptcy or other maneuvers that are 
costly to lenders.37 The uncertainty and costs of potentially opportunistic 
behavior in this situation are factors that are thought to lead to integration 
or the delegation to a coach to manage the relationship. But that integra-
tion does not happen here. Rather, the costs of the market transactions to 
sort out the locus and levers of control are still low enough for govern-
ance to remain a market product. On the other side of the same coin, the 
costs of integration and allocation of control, to the board or other team 
leader, are high enough to force governance into the market.38 
Finally, critiques of the board and reports of, or calls for, its total 
demise miss the point. To a large degree, the role of the board is irrele-
vant. It is just one means of centralizing decisions that occur within the 
firm. If the board was removed, a firm’s internal decisions would be pro-
duced by a management committee or a lone CEO (the equivalent of a 
one-person board). These considerations are peripheral to the main in-
quiry. The specific organization of internal decisions is of little im-
portance when compared to the question of which things happen internal-
ly and which happen in the market. 
Thus, solutions focusing on the board or treating contracts inside 
the firm the same as those outside the firm get it wrong. For example, 
proposals to restructure the board or to create investor boards made of 
representatives of primary stakeholders would artificially expand the 
firm to encompass market relationships that have resisted integration. In 
                                                 
 36. This happens quite often in practice. Victoria Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity 
Advantage: Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship Banking, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2462, 2467 
(2011) (“Typically, bank loan covenants are set close to default levels.”). Triggers set to go off only 
when absolutely needed do not give lenders sufficient leeway to avert problems before they arise. 
Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ Selective 
Enforcement, YALE L. J.  (forthcoming 2015). 
 37. Prepayment penalties can make it difficult for debtors to use refinancing as a threat to 
counter this action. Then again, bankruptcy may, in some cases, nullify those penalties. The ability 
to contract around that outcome is uncertain. See, e.g., In re AMR, 730 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (ex-
ploring the law on make whole penalties); see also Casey, supra note 36. 
 38. One of these costs is that integration into a single firm producing governance may make it 
difficult to maintain the discipline and incentives from market participation, such as state-contingent 
penalties on various input providers. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 33; Douglas G. Baird & 
Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2013); Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 33; Casey, supra note 36. 
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the leading such proposal, Professor Kelli Alces suggests the novel con-
cept of an “investor board” that places “a collection of activist investors 
at the top of the corporate hierarchy.”39 She notes that her investor board 
would be “better at performing both board functions.”40 As we suggest 
throughout, scholars like Alces are starting from the right insight: market 
contracts play a large role in corporate control. She relies, in part, on the 
insight made by Douglas Baird and M. Todd Henderson that the law of 
fiduciary duties is outdated and flawed and that agreements with market 
participants should be respected. 41  This is true, and Alces’s analysis 
sheds enormous light on the problems inherent in corporate law’s focus 
on the board. The solution to that problem, though, is not an expansion of 
the firm to bring market transactions into the hierarchy. That would inter-
fere with market production in novel, but equally problematic ways. 
Alces’s analysis comes closer to ours when she proposes that the 
investor board may someday whither away “allowing the network of in-
vestor contracts . . . to perform the functions once delegated to the board 
of directors.”42 That proposal, however, goes too far in the other direc-
tion and externalizes those things that have consciously been integrated. 
Our point is that the network of investor contracts already performs 
many corporate governance functions, while the board performs other 
functions that are more appropriately contained within the firm. Like 
Alces, we worry that there are sets of decisions where the law artificially 
places the board at the helm of market functions. But bringing external 
decisions into the firm in the hope of one day pushing internal decisions 
out is counterproductive to the market for corporate governance. The 
obstacles holding back some market functions, which we discuss below, 
have nothing to do with the existence of the board but rather, (1) the con-
flation of internal and external governance where market decisions are 
forced into internal management hierarchies, and (2) the long-recognized 
failing of fiduciary duty law. Put another way, the solution lies not in 
eradicating the board of directors, but rather in delineating its boundaries 
and abandoning the false notion that it is at the core of the analysis of 
corporate governance issues. 
A Coasean theory of the firm leads to the appropriate remedy—it 
allows us to differentiate between contracts that are enforced by courts 
                                                 
 39. Alces, Beyond the Board, supra note 2, at 813. 
 40. Id. at 823. 
 41. Id. at 816, 817 (citing Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1339 (2008)). 
 42. Id. at 836. 
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and those that are enforced by the hierarch.43 Some agreements are en-
tered into and enforced within the hierarchy; others are played out in the 
open market. The line between the two was at the heart of Coase’s defi-
nition of the firm, and we should not conflate those two types of relation-
ships. 
To get a better sense of the phenomenon we are beginning to de-
scribe, it is worth taking a closer look at specific examples of the way in 
which creditors exercise control and handle problems of residual control 
using market-like mechanisms. 
III. A LOOK AT THE MARKET PRODUCTION OF CREDITOR GOVERNANCE 
Creditors occupy an important place in this governance constella-
tion. In some places, like in much of Europe and Asia, banks fund much 
of the debt side of corporate balance sheets, and, as holders of this debt, 
exercise direct and explicit control over much of corporate 
decisionmaking. In other places, as in most firms in the United States 
today, debt is more likely to be held by a diffuse group of bond holders 
with little explicit control over governance other than that created by the 
need of the borrower to return to the bond market. In the United States, 
bonds represent about half of debt funding, while in Europe, vanilla bank 
loans are much more important.44 There are also hybrid cases in which 
creditors hold a more complex security, such as preferred shares, and the 
“lender,” like a venture capital fund, exercises a range of control rights 
by contract and by industry custom. These funds often occupy a central 
role in an even more complicated firm structure with several layers of 
active investors and managers. The investment instruments the firms use 
are not quite analogous to traditional debt or equity, but the investment 
funds (and not the board) are undeniably at the hub of a massive team of 
governance. 
But even with the inclusion of this hybrid case, the picture is still 
incomplete and highly misleading. Instead, many types of corporate fun-
ders participate in debt interests of innumerable variety, often in compli-
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cated and shifting ways that defy easy categorization. The providers of 
debt—ranging from venture capital firms (for startups) to private equity 
firms (for turnarounds), from banks to bondholders, and from insurance 
firms to individual investors—are increasingly diffuse with no hierarchy, 
and are governed by a web of decentralized contractual and quasi-
contractual arrangements. These market-based contracts are nimble in 
how they adapt to changing rules and market conditions. 
Next, we will consider a series of simplified examples that demon-
strate our claim. The first example is a relatively simple case in which a 
borrower has multiple liens on a particular piece of collateral. The lien 
holders may enter into a standstill agreement in which the second lien 
holder gives up some control over its collateral. But likewise, the first 
lien holder has given up some of its control by consenting to the exist-
ence of the second lien holder. These agreements are ubiquitous in mod-
ern corporate finance. How then do the lien holders resolve their govern-
ance rights with respect to the collateral in question, which, after all, is 
only valuable as an input into one corporate process or another? The 
concrete answer is through a contract, known as an inter-creditor agree-
ment. These agreements do not, however, assign residual control to one 
lender or the other, or to the board (or to a Chinese guy with a whip, as 
described supra in Part II). The standstill agreements have terms that will 
be enforced by courts, but also contain limits that leave open space for 
disagreement. Where those terms are incomplete, ex post haggling in the 
market takes over. Notice the board is nowhere in this account, but con-
trol over a particular asset of the borrower is clearly at stake. 
The second example involves the role a senior secured lender plays 
in the governance of large private and public firms. While there is a dis-
pute in the literature about whether secured or unsecured debt engages in 
more general monitoring of corporate decisionmaking,45 debt contracts 
often contain terms by which junior creditors rely heavily on senior cred-
itors to provide monitoring signals, even when their own interests may 
create incentives to do otherwise. For example, “anti-layering” provi-
sions delegate to the senior lender the decision on how risky junior bonds 
will be. The anti-layering provision might provide that the borrower can-
not take on debt that falls between the bonds and the senior secured cred-
itor.46 Notably, other terms of these debt contracts would allow the bor-
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rower to expand its debt under the existing senior loan.47 In theory, a 
bondholder should be indifferent between a debt structure where there is 
$2 million in first lien debt and a debt structure where there is $1 million 
in first lien and $1 million in other senior debt. Yet the typical anti-
layering provisions allow the first option and not the second one. In this 
way, the junior creditors are relying on the senior lenders to test the risk 
that is tolerable—perhaps because of the senior lenders’ expertise, in-
formation, and reputation in a repeat-play game. Monitoring of corporate 
activity, here, is being exercised by and among various lenders and types 
of lenders in ways that bear directly on corporate policy and that largely 
resist an integrated governance structure. 
A third example involves agreements in modern lending syndicates. 
These agreements are instructive of the nebulous and market-based as-
pects of control by and among lenders. As a base case, if a single lender 
fails to fund a draw on a revolving debt facility, the debtor has a setoff 
remedy when the lender pursues contractual payments such as scheduled 
commitment fees. But what happens when the debt is held by a syndicate 
of banks and not all banks fail to fund? This possibility arose when the 
financial crisis hit in 2008, as many banks, like Lehman Brothers, could 
no longer fund their loan obligations in open credit facilities. This pre-
sented thorny issues for borrowers and lenders under syndicated credit 
facilities. 
In a liquid market, “yank-a-bank” provisions in the agreement 
might have allowed for the replacement of the defaulting bank with an-
other lender.48 But in 2008 and 2009, there were many situations where 
no such alternative lender existed.49 That raised a new set of problems for 
the borrowers and the nondefaulting lenders. 
As one might expect, the collective action problem had been ad-
dressed ex ante by appointing an administrative agent to make certain 
decisions when disputes arose. The administrative agent might be 
thought to be the coach of the creditor team, but that is not accurate. The 
agent’s control is limited by the contract and is not residual. Perhaps sur-
prisingly for the theory of teams, the credit facilities often contained only 
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vague provisions for dealing with the defaulting lender problem in the 
syndicate, and the agent was not given residual or gap-filling authority. 
Under many of these loans, the administrative agent was arguably re-
quired to distribute payments from the debtor among the lenders regard-
less of their failure to fund new borrowing. 50  Fearing a lawsuit, an 
agent’s best defense would be to act mechanically under the terms of the 
agreement. Thus, any setoff by the borrower would have caused a pro 
rata underpayment to all of the funding lenders and a breach by the bor-
rower. This creates a multilateral standoff among all of the lenders as 
well as the borrower. 
A banal, but important, observation from this case is that the costs 
of assigning residual authority exceed the benefits for these lending syn-
dicates, at least in the underfunding case. The story we can tell here is 
relatively straightforward. The banks in the syndicate are repeat players 
with large reputations, and any opportunism or advantage taking in one 
case is likely to be repaid in another. But there are more interesting as-
pects to this example. First, the opportunism here is entirely predictable, 
and therefore any incomplete contracting cannot be attributed to a lack of 
imagination, but rather something else. Second, the contracts among 
lenders do not just impact the lenders, but also interact with the control 
of the borrower. In other words, the incompleteness and the lack of a 
coach are features of the corporate governance of the borrower. Again, 
the board is nowhere in this picture. 
A fourth example involves the behavior of creditors in bankruptcy. 
When Chrysler went into bankruptcy, the members of its lending syndi-
cate found themselves at odds with each other.51 The majority of lenders 
in the syndicate had received TARP funds and were each assumed to be 
in constant communication with the federal authorities with regard to the 
automotive industry as well as the financial crisis more generally. Presi-
dent Obama even appointed a “czar” to manage the government’s deal-
ings with the auto industry. A small minority of lenders was not behold-
en to the federal government. As the federal government was the primary 
supporter of the Chrysler bankruptcy plan, the minority was suspicious 
when the majority voted to present a gift of value from all senior lenders 
to the United Auto Workers. But the secured loan facility contained vir-
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tually no terms limiting the ability of the majority to vote in favor of a 
bankruptcy plan.52  
A similar scenario emerged when, in 2010, the Third Circuit al-
lowed debtors to prohibit credit bidding.53 In the wake of this decision, 
lenders publicly worried that they had lost a tool for quelling dissent 
among their ranks. Without the ability to credit bid, the participants in 
credit facilities had no obvious means for preventing a holdout lender 
from destroying value for the group as a whole. Again, the contracts 
were silent on exactly what to do in these circumstances. The law firms 
and blogs were abuzz with suggestions on how to rewrite contracts or 
even change from syndicated loans to smaller loans with individual 
banks.54 
A fifth example is about venture capital investments in startup firms. 
It is hard to categorize venture capitalists into any class of investor. Tra-
ditionally, the investment they make is in the form of preferred equity. 
Their decision to demand a board seat along with the investment turns on 
how big a stake one firm takes, how many other venture capital firms are 
involved, and other particulars of the firm they are investing in. One 
might expect that where several firms invest and one takes a role on the 
board, there is some sort of reliance between these firms. But such 
agreements are tacit, if they exist at all, and they do not generally dele-
gate residual authority to anyone, least of all the board of the startup. 
It should also be noted that the venture capital firm might not be the 
only investor. Venture debt may be overlaid in the capital structure. Here 
the workings of the team come into play. There are only a handful of 
banks providing major venture debt. They pick their projects by looking 
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at what the venture capital firms they know are doing. To be sure, the 
venture banks do their own due diligence before investing, but they will 
not even start the process until they know a reliable venture capital firm 
has vetted the investment. 
But the signaling and reliance goes both ways. Banks compete 
heavily to be the lender of the best projects. This means that successful 
venture capital firms can pick and choose. New entrants are not trusted. 
And banks that exited during the recession without trying to create value 
won’t be welcomed back favorably. As a result, venture capital firms can 
negotiate for favorable terms with credible banks. But it also means that 
they are not as concerned with technical covenant defaults as they are 
with the reputation of the bank. 
In this environment, the terms of lending contracts are less im-
portant than one might think given the presence of alternative methods of 
discipline—lots of covenants, or few covenants, are equally likely to re-
sult in the optimal exercise of control since borrowers can reject lenders 
tomorrow who abuse them today. Accordingly, while there was little that 
venture capital funds could do when some venture banks became trigger-
happy with their covenants in the depths of the Great Recession, those 
trigger-happy banks are no longer welcome in that investment communi-
ty; those that remain understand that such behavior has its consequences. 
Markets work, and sometimes provide discipline that is a compliment to, 
or substitute for, explicit contracts or delegated control. 
The final, related example involves private equity fund investments 
in portfolio companies. There is conflicting data on whether lenders tend 
to lighten their covenants in repeated dealings with private equity firms 
in investments, including leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Some have sug-
gested that the covenant intensity should go down as the private equity 
firms provide a signal of the quality of the investment, which reduces the 
costs of asymmetric information.55 Others have suggested that the private 
equity firms often have higher leverage and that provides opportunity for 
greater risk taking, and thus, requires the lender to use more restrictive 
covenants.56 The data is mixed, however, providing no easy answer to 
which of these stories is more accurate.57 
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But there is another possible factor: the lenders are competing to 
provide loans to private equity funds. Just as a lender gets a signal from a 
reputable private equity firm, so too does a private equity fund (or ven-
ture capital fund) have lenders it trusts and lenders it does not. It may be 
that a trusted lender can be relied on not to exercise heavy covenants in a 
destructive way, whereas an unknown lender might be trigger-happy. If 
this were true, we would see heavy covenants in repeated relationships, 
while the junior investors might demand lighter covenants from un-
known lenders. At the very least, this is an important dynamic in the ne-
gotiation of covenants in any deal. 
While seemingly remote from any discussion of the theory of the 
firm, an obvious lesson from these examples is that even the most so-
phisticated loan agreements are incomplete and riddled with potential for 
opportunistic behavior. They, like all other contracts, are incomplete and 
have no allocation of residual control. 
A reader familiar with organizational scholarship on team produc-
tion would expect this to be fertile ground for the emergence of a “team” 
in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz, Holmstrom, or Blair and Stout. Or, 
more abstractly, one might expect a delegated third party be vested with 
residual authority to arbitrate contract disputes among the parties and to 
provide a gap-filling role. Across the myriad capital structures found in 
today’s business world, no such team has emerged. There is no coach, 
only players. The market has apparently determined that the cost of do-
ing business in that environment is worth it compared to the cost of inte-
grating. 
That is not to say that every lender is an island. Lenders continu-
ously collaborate with each other, with management, and with other 
stakeholders. But they do so as independent players dealing at arm’s 
length with no central leader. Discipline for opportunistic behavior does 
not come from above but rather from the flanks. Where contract terms 
fail, reputation, norms, and other relational mechanisms provide protec-
tion for market participants. 
By itself, this observation is nothing new. Teams emerge in some 
production functions and not in others; informal contracting and norms 
dominate many markets.58 That lenders do not rely on a team structure 
does not undercut team production theory writ large. But our observation 
should not be taken by itself. There are two other factors that complicate 
our view of corporate governance. First, there is an increasing variety of 
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entities that provide investment and many types of debt. And for any 
given amount of debt, there are even more holders of that debt. The secu-
ritization market, which is flourishing for corporate debt, is an example 
of this phenomenon. The second is that providers of debt are playing an 
increasing role in corporate governance. 
Putting these observations together creates a new topography of 
corporate governance. Others have said governance is not just about 
shareholders, the board, workers, and so forth, but also about lenders and 
others who exist outside the firm. What we add to their observations is an 
exploration of the production function that these outsiders are part of. 
Their influence comes neither from an isolated lender pulling a control 
lever nor from a team of lenders who have submitted to the leadership of 
one trusted bank. Nor does it come from a hub-and-spoke relationship 
with lenders, each making a bilateral, single agreement with the board. 
Instead, investors produce a suite of enforcement rights (formal and in-
formal) that they separate and allocate in endless combinations with the 
rights of other investors and controlling parties. And the actions of one 
outsider exercising its subset of rights have ripple effects throughout the 
entire capital structure. Those actions are not policed by a hierarchical 
manager even when contracts are powerless. Instead, the corporate gov-
ernance produced at the hands of lenders is an organic force that is poor-
ly understood. In this way, our project looks to take the creditor govern-
ance literature as a jumping off point for further inquiry. 
IV. SOME TENTATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Although we have not done nearly enough work in describing the 
new corporate governance milieu to draw any strong conclusions about 
what it all means, we will take a moment to lay down a brief marker that 
will hopefully be an inspiration for future work. 
A. The Distortion Caused by Fiduciary Duties 
In modern corporate governance scholarship and practice, the board 
of directors is where all the action is. A leading theory of the firm is 
called “director primacy,” since it makes both a positive and normative 
case that the board should be the central node of all governance.59 Critics 
of the board even acknowledge its centrality. They just believe share-
holders, or maybe workers or politics, should have a greater influence in 
who sits in those chairs. In all these accounts, fiduciary duties are the 
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mechanism through which the board’s allegiance to the “owners” or 
“stakeholders” is vindicated. We believe these stories are as untrue as 
they are dangerous. 
The control exercised by creditors and other investors often hap-
pens to include boards on which the investors take a seat. But it is diffi-
cult to know if the boards serve any purpose or are just a means to com-
ply with a meaningless formal requirement.60 As a mere formality, they 
should do no harm. The concern is that the judicial and scholarly obses-
sion with boards leads to other distortions. Thus, venture capital inves-
tors sitting on a board might use the board as an informal means for ne-
gotiation of market contracts.61 The courts might, however, miss the nu-
ance and inject the rules governing internal firm decisions into these 
market transactions just because they are being conducted among mem-
bers of the board.62 The fear is that a variety of market transactions will 
artificially be forced within the firm. This can have real costs. For in-
stance, if every decision runs through the board, then fiduciary duties 
begin to creep out to market relationships in perverse ways. 
In most cases, fiduciary duties are just an aspirational statement of 
how directors “should” behave, with little legal force behind them.63 Fi-
duciary standards may have some power in providing guidance to direc-
tors who take their stated “duty” seriously without external enforcement. 
That can be valuable if the duties are correctly identified, but also prob-
lematic if incorrectly identified—such as when they suggest that the in-
ternal power of the board can trump the external market. 
But when the duties are enforced, it is with little predictability and 
sometimes can be used to invalidate a market transaction that should not 
be governed by fiduciary duties.64 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, 
Inc., is the most egregious of such cases.65 These uncertain applications 
of duties are difficult to contract around and are therefore hard to avoid. 
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When courts are not just randomly enforcing fiduciary duties, gen-
erally speaking, the outer bounds of acceptable behavior for directors 
approaches something along the lines of fraud. That outer bound is ac-
ceptable because the market does what the law cannot: it punishes in-
competence and conflict that is short of fraud. And it does so on all lev-
els, not just for one group of investors. The idea that without fiduciary 
duty law corporate governance would collapse into widespread tunneling 
of assets and other forms of theft is not a serious claim. Blatant fraud is 
illegal regardless of fiduciary duties. Other forms of conflict that lie in a 
gray area are as likely to lead to market reaction as any legal process 
based on fiduciary duties is to incent the right conduct. 
The recent Trados litigation exemplifies the deification of the board 
and a misapplication of fiduciary duties.66 The court reasoned that a ven-
ture capital investor sitting on the board of directors was required to pro-
tect the option value of equity. 67  The problem is that this creates a 
strange world where creditors exercising power they bargained for in a 
private company are now subject to fiduciary duties to equity because 
they happen to take a seat on the board. It is entirely plausible that ven-
ture capital funds take equity interests not because they want a seat on 
the board but because they want control that is easy to trigger. With well 
established companies, lenders are happy to have covenants that are trig-
gered by familiar problems. But with a startup, the investors do not know 
what signal of distress they will receive. All investors want options in 
responding to signals of failure;68 venture capital investors demand the 
broadest of options. They want to be able to vote for a change of course 
without calling a default. Incidental to acquiring that power is a seat on 
the board of directors—where equity has to go to flex its muscle by de-
fault. But the result of obtaining that seat is that the courts may impose 
vague notions of fiduciary obligation on the investors that begin to look 
like lender liability for venture capital firms. 
This creates an unfortunate thicket of legal obligations for what 
would otherwise be a straightforward contractual relationship between an 
entrepreneur and investors.69 Moreover, the idea of duty to maximize 
option value is one that is in conflict with even the concept that a board 
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must maximize the value of the firm.70 In the end, the Trados court 
avoided any real implication of its rhetoric by finding that the option val-
ue was zero.71 But that convenient fact is unlikely to present in every 
case where an investor protects its bargained-for rights at the expense of 
an entrepreneur. 
The solution is not to change the structure of the board, but to dif-
ferentiate between how the law treats external and internal governance 
relationships. Indeed, it may require more nuance than just abandoning 
fiduciary duties. To the extent that fiduciary duties are relevant, they may 
provide a baseline for the resolution of disputes within the firm’s hierar-
chy.72 They should then be cabined to the internal workings of the firm. 
For example, it may be reasonable for an employee to assume that a de-
cision to move her from department X to department Y will be made 
with the best interests of the firm in mind, and not out of animus or the 
self-interest of the division manager—at least when no outside parties 
have a say in the decision. Similarly, where two divisions of a conglom-
erate enter a contract arbitrated by the hierarch73 there may be a back-
ground assumption that, in the absence of a statement to the contrary, the 
contract will be interpreted and enforced to the benefit of the enterprise 
as a whole.74 Of course, this would only work if subject to the most 
broad business judgment presumption. One can still imagine that a base-
line of maximizing the value of the enterprise could serve significant 
value when dealing with internally arbitrated governance decisions and 
could affect the interests of those who have made significant relation-
ship-specific investments. 75  But the baseline is entirely inappropriate 
when addressing the relationships between various actors in the external 
market. If a loan agreement provides that a worker shall be moved from 
department X to department Y, then the only question is whether that 
loan agreement was validly executed. 
This problem is manifest most for public companies, where fiduci-
ary duties are most rigorously enforced and board actions most scruti-
nized by shareholders. In public firms, large shareholders, including in-
stitutions, hedge funds, and takeover specialists like Carl Icahn, play the 
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most important role in governance.76 Lenders take a decided back seat, in 
large part because of the robustness of the fiduciary duty regime in limit-
ing freedom of contract, and thus disabling lenders’ and other stakehold-
ers’ main mechanism of interest protection. Blair and Stout may argue 
correctly that the business judgment rule gives boards latitude.77 But at 
least in judicial rhetoric, the idea of shareholder wealth maximization is 
strong, and fiduciary duties are understood to be about protecting the 
interests of shareholders. 
And that rhetoric seems to have some bite in practice. Indeed, the 
idea of shareholder maximization maintains a sort of hypnotic power 
over courts, boards, funds, and pundits alike—even in insolvency cases 
where one would expect the duty to shareholders to be extinguished. 
Thus, in the Trados case, discussed above, the board had to show that the 
transaction at issue was entirely fair to equity, despite the fact that the 
firm was insolvent. The ongoing litigation over Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac is an even more egregious example of this.78 Hedge funds have 
flocked to the courts to challenge the idea that a board of a hopelessly 
insolvent company might be able to consider the interests of stakeholders 
other than out-of-money equity.79 They appear to claim that, by not fa-
voring the option value of the out-of-the-money shareholders, the man-
agers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac breached their fiduciary duties to 
those shareholders. Richard Epstein has gone as far as declaring the gov-
ernment’s action in the case to be a taking.80 But before one can have a 
taking, one must establish that there was something to take. One could 
only get there by falling under the spell of the shareholder-maximization 
sirens.81 
B. Deemphasizing Shareholders Emphasizes Shareholders 
A related point is that there is an irony of the Blair and Stout criti-
cism: their attempt to deemphasize shareholders by running governance 
                                                 
 76. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic 
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 
(2014). 
 77. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 299–300. 
 78. See generally Adam B. Badawi & Anthony J. Casey, The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts 
Through the Corporate Lens, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. (forthcoming 2014) (describing the various 
arguments and issues in the Fannie and Freddie litigation and collecting sources). 
 79. See id. (analyzing the Fannie and Freddie debate and noting the lack of a coherent argu-
ment that there was value taken in 2012). 
 80. Richard Epstein, When Our Government Commits Fraud, DEFINING IDEAS (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/when-our-government-commits-fraud. 
 81. See Badawi & Casey, supra note 78. 
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through the board turns out to actually empower shareholders to be the 
most powerful voice in governance. As noted above, stakeholders of all 
kinds (be they creditors, workers, or communities) can, and do, protect 
themselves using contracts. These contracts are versatile, customizable, 
and adapt rapidly to changing legal and market conditions. But when all 
governance is routed through a board of directors, as Blair and Stout ar-
gue and wish for, then these contracts are inherently limited in what they 
can accomplish. Fiduciary duties are vague and give boards wide latitude, 
bounded only by somewhat unpredictable judicial interpretation. But 
they also create strange litigation options in the form of implicit or re-
quired fiduciary outs. This means that the ability of creditors and other 
stakeholders to tailor corporate governance to their ends is limited. 
Lenders can still maintain influence through the use of covenants. 
They can easily negotiate for priority through security interests. They can 
carve out special withdrawal rights with entity partitions.82 Or they can 
create selective enforcement options. These levers of control over the 
board are clear and formal. They are also more difficult for other stake-
holders to contract for or to enforce in a board-centric world. 
Two potentially value-enhancing possibilities are more difficult in a 
board-centered regime. First, nonlender stakeholders may have more dif-
ficulty contracting in the way lenders do, and therefore may be disfa-
vored in this regime.83 Take the litigation involving craigslist and eBay 
as an example.84 The community of users of craigslist’s free market was 
an undeniable stakeholder; without that community, craigslist would not 
exist. There is some kind of informal and implicit agreement between the 
firm and that community. If craigslist upsets them, the whole thing could 
tank. But despite all the talk about the business judgment rule and the 
suggestions by academics that Dodge v. Ford85 is dead, the Delaware 
Chancery court stated explicitly that protecting that community was not a 
proper act of a board of directors of a corporation.86 And that was a 
closely held corporation with only three shareholders where the holders 
of an overwhelming majority of shares approved of the action!87 If the 
firm cannot react to the governance market, value will be lost. 
                                                 
 82. See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of 
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013). 
 83. We draw on Professor Alces’s insights here. Alces, Beyond the Board, supra note 2. 
 84. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 85. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 86. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d 1. 
 87. The court also expressed some skepticism about the actual motivation for the board’s ac-
tions. Those factual matters may have driven the outcome of the case. But the legal standards an-
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Similarly, it is much harder to imagine how employees or unions 
could contract for the same efficient rights that lenders do. In the case of 
Chrysler, the gift to unions may have been necessary to enforce the prac-
tical control rights that the unions possess. But the law as many under-
stood it made that gift illegal and subjected the outcome to criticism. 
This issue plagues many bankruptcies today as courts struggle to define 
the limits of gifting and the new value exception. 
Second, fiduciary duties can prevent lenders from acting in ways 
that may enhance firm value. Randal Kroszner and Philip Strahan’s work 
regarding bankers serving on corporate boards provides evidence of a 
board-centric model limiting innovation. 88  In a board-centric world, 
bankers may sit on boards as a means of influencing governance and of 
obtaining information. Sure enough, about one-third of U.S. large firms 
have a banker on their board.89 Up to a point, Kroszner and Strahan find 
that bank monitoring of this type increases the risk to firm assets.90 The 
likelihood of a banker serving on a board first increases and then de-
creases in firm volatility, a measure of risk. One potential reason is that 
at high levels of risk, the potential for a shareholder lawsuit increases, 
and courts could find the lenders serving on the board to be in control of 
the firm. Thus, the lenders would be liable for firm debts, or have their 
claims subject to equitable subordination.91  
More generally, boards and fiduciary duties may make governance 
innovation more costly than optimal. We see much more governance in-
novation in nonpublic and noncorporate business forms. In other types of 
firms, including private companies, governance is more customizable. To 
venture capital firms, private equity firms, and investors in private firms, 
the difference between being an owner and a lender is semantic. Inves-
tors seek a bundle of control rights tailored to the needs of the firm, the 
market conditions, and the legal regime. What these are called is unim-
portant. The decision instead is driven by the relative transaction costs 
involved. If tailored governance is observed in these firms and not in 
public firms, this may suggest optimal sorting—that is, the firms that 
need specialized governance are private and those that do not are public. 
But since we observe public firms going private, in part driven by gov-
                                                                                                             
nounced in the case were framed in general terms, and nothing about the court’s language suggested 
that it was intended to be offhand dicta or a rule of limited application. 
 88. See Kroszner & Strahan, supra note 32. 
 89. Id. at 417. 
 90. Id. at 418. 
 91. Even in the private context, investors have been put in a precarious position as a result of 
having a seat on a board. See Trados discussion supra Part IV.A; Bartlett, supra note 60. 
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ernance issues, we can safely conclude that there is a suboptimal level of 
governance innovation in public firms. This is because it is extremely 
expensive and risky to take a firm private, and in our current system, 
there is no option for separating governance from control. 
C. Identifying External Governance 
To be clear, we are not saying that everything happens by contract 
or transaction external to the firm. While some scholars define the corpo-
ration or a firm as a thing in itself, others have suggested that it is more 
appropriate to view it as a collection of stakeholder interests.92 Several 
strands of literature build on that contractual view of firms. Thus, a 
growing number of scholars now examine creditor control,93 alternative 
views of who stakeholders are, and concepts of “post-board” firms.94 
While we start from the same observation of the market relations of 
stakeholders, we suggest these pure contractarian views do not get things 
quite right. 
The error comes from the current tendency to ignore a fundamental 
disconnect between a Coasean theory and a contractarian view of firms. 
The question is not whether the firm is a siloed entity or a nexus of con-
tracts. The better question is the Coasean one: what decisions are being 
produced within the firm (at the ultimate direction of the hierarch), and 
what decisions are being produced outside the firm. Just as the share-
holder-centric literature errs when it assumes shareholders are making all 
decisions for a firm and the board-centric literature errs when it assumes 
the board is making all the decisions, the contractarian literature errs by 
suggesting that market contracts control all decisions.95 Equating a cove-
nant in a credit facility with a board’s or CEO’s direction for a firm to 
undertake a new marketing campaign is to ignore Coase’s fundamental 
insight about the boundaries of firms altogether. While these two things 
may reduce to contractual sources if we abstract enough, one cannot se-
riously maintain that a contract with an outsider and a directive from a 
                                                 
 92. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 93. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 10; Tung, supra note 10. 
 94. Kelli Alces coined this term to describe a firm that collects the interests of its shareholders 
and can function without a board. In one version, she proposes a firm run by an investors committee. 
In an extreme version, the firm is run entirely by the contracts that make it up. See Alces, Beyond the 
Board, supra note 2. 
 95. It is here that our analysis differs from that of Gulati, Klein, and Zolt. See supra note 35. 
Where they present a model that describes everything the firm does in contractual terms, we suggest 
a bifurcated analysis of the production function of the firm and the production of governance. 
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manager are the same thing.96 The reality is that market governance is 
more organic and does not arise from a hierarchy, a team, or any hub-
and-spoke set of relationships. Tweaking one contract or relationship can 
have incidental effects that are not as predictable or direct as the hub-
and-spoke metaphor suggests. Again, the Chrysler bankruptcy provides 
an extreme but demonstratively useful example. The Government’s deci-
sion to give TARP funds to large banks changed the relationship those 
banks had with other investors who were party to the Chrysler credit fa-
cility. That dramatically changed the governance decisions and litigation 
in the Chrysler bankruptcy even though it involved no transaction involv-
ing Chrysler directly. 
D. Rethinking Takeover Defenses 
Finally, our analysis of the realities of modern corporate govern-
ance departs radically from the takeover literature of the 1980s, which 
viewed control as produced by firms (through boards and managers) and 
generally housed within a single firm.97 The insight from scholars ob-
serving the takeover craze of that era was the simple point that some-
times the market could do better. Because governance was entirely inside 
a firm and run through the board, the market provider had to gain control 
of the board to improve governance. In that way, hostile takeovers and 
proxy contests provided the full market mechanism.98 
But the “control” being transferred there is only a slice of the larger 
governance picture. One cannot often really take over a firm just by en-
                                                 
 96. This point focuses our attention on a fundamental challenge in the theory of the firm litera-
ture. Analysis often devolves to a question of defining terms. We can say that firms are just extreme-
ly entrenched or long-term contracts. But then the question becomes why parties enter such contracts. 
Coase was acutely aware of this. Coase, supra note 1, at n.21. The relevant question is not what 
word we use to describe the difference between the covenant and the manager’s directive. The rele-
vant question is why debt-to-equity ratios are determined by the former and marketing campaigns 
are determined by the latter. Cf. Casey & Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 
1687 n.16 (2013) (“It is unimportant that that relationship may nominally be created by a long-term 
contract. The outcome is the same, and the difference is semantic. Importantly, we are distinguishing 
hierarchical production from outright market purchase that occurs after a good is produced. There 
are, of course, grey areas between those extremes.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 
YALE. L.J. 698, 737 (1982). 
 98. Incidentally, it also made for a great deus ex machina in films about big business. For ex-
ample, the resolutions of such varied films as BATMAN BEGINS (Legendary Pictures 2005) and 
DODGEBALL: A TRUE UNDERDOG STORY (Red Hour Films 2004) rely heavily on a clean (though 
improbable) transfer of control through this hostile takeover market. Indeed, in the underappreciated 
‘80s classic, THE SECRET OF MY SUCCESS (Rastar 1987), Michael J. Fox wraps up the entire film in 
a five-minute board meeting by announcing a hostile (but benevolent) takeover. The film then fades 
out to the tune of Pat Benatar singing, “Sometimes the Good Guys Finish First.” 
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gaging in a “takeover” (that is, buying a majority of shares). Loans will 
generally have to be refinanced or lender approval acquired. “Poison puts” 
may make it impossible to even change a slate of directors without lender 
consent.99 And sometimes even lender approval will often not be enough. 
Consider again the Chrysler bankruptcy. Putting aside the doctrinal 
questions of legality of the sale of Chrysler, one thing is plain from the 
case: the combination of consenting stakeholders necessary to sell con-
trol was staggering. The private lenders had to agree among themselves. 
The managers had to consent to and propose a plan. Most people assume 
that the United States government had to approve any deal (both in its 
role as a senior lender and as a political entity).100 The Canadian gov-
ernment also had to be on board.101 And most controversially, the unions 
had to go along. Indeed, the strongest defense of the bankruptcy sale in 
Chrysler—which transferred immense value from creditors to unions—
was that as a practical matter, the unions had to be appeased if Chrysler 
was to be sold as a going concern that made cars in the United States.102 
This is today’s takeover market. It is massive and complicated and 
involves a lot more than poison pills and hostile tenders for shares. Be-
cause the control is produced in a market and is not centralized in a firm, 
transfers can be complicated and often require judicial intervention—
even for solvent firms. 
The Texas Rangers bankruptcy provides another plain example of 
this.103 The Rangers firm was poorly managed, and its corporate parent 
was insolvent. All parties agreed that it needed to be sold. But the team 
itself (housed in a separate legal entity) was easily worth more than its 
liabilities. So why did the Rangers file for bankruptcy? 
The Commissioner of Baseball and JPMorgan Chase (the senior 
lender to the parent company) both had contractual rights to approve or 
veto any sale of the team but disagreed on who it should be sold to. The 
Commissioner seemed only willing to approve a sale to a purchaser run 
by Nolan Ryan. JPMorgan Chase claimed that the sale to Ryan was a 
                                                 
 99. The enforceability of these may not be ironclad, but that goes to our point about the law 
hindering the market. 
 100. We will not even start to delve into the internal workings necessary to get an official 
position from the government. 
 101. Roe & Skeel, supra note 51, at 733 n.11 (citing Affidavit of Ronald E. Kolka in Support 
of First Day Pleadings ¶¶ 92, 108, In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (No. 09 B 50002 (AJG)), 2009 WL 1266134. 
 102. See Baird, supra note 52. We have not even touched on the control rights that the Su-
preme Court of the United States may have declined to exercise there. See Ind. State Police Pension 
Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009). 
 103. See In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, 434 B.R. 393 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010). 
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sweetheart deal, with no market test, that transferred value from JPMor-
gan Chase to one of Baseball’s favored sons.104 That may have been true, 
or JPMorgan Chase may have been attempting a classic opportunistic 
hold up.105 
The contracts were silent on what to do when JPMorgan Chase and 
the Commissioner had created a stalemate preventing a sale with their 
dueling veto powers. The court had to fill the gaps of the incomplete con-
tract. The court essentially split the difference and nullified JPMorgan 
Chase’s veto right but forced a market test for the sale to Nolan Ryan’s 
firm.106 The court noted that JPMorgan Chase might retain a right to sue 
for damages for breach of the veto right, but those damages were certain 
to be zero in the eyes of the court that approved the sale as part of an 
auction it helped design.107  
In all of this, the board was irrelevant. It was not even clear who the 
board was once JPMorgan Chase pushed the parent company into invol-
untary bankruptcy and claimed that it controlled the equity in the team. 
The court punted on that question and appointed a restructuring officer to 
manage the Rangers in bankruptcy.108 Governance of the Rangers was 
thus in the hands of a bank, the Commissioner of Baseball, a court (or 
many possible courts, both trial and appellate), as well as various other 
stakeholders, including players,109 fans, the media, and other baseball 
teams. 
This suggests a new model of takeover defenses. If today’s takeo-
vers look increasingly like the situation in Chrysler (with or without such 
a central role for Uncle Sam), then the conventional stories become less 
relevant. We have no quibble with the idea that the market for corporate 
governance would be efficient, but merely point out that this theory may 
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falter as a descriptive and normative matter when you define the market 
so narrowly as to just include equity. 
Once the market for governance expands, as we think it should, to 
include more and more places where governance is actually exercised, 
and to include more mechanisms through which it is exercised, takeover 
defenses have to be rethought. The takeaway may well be that poison 
pills and their ilk are part of the market, not obstacles to it. It is wrong to 
think that the directors’ only goal is to maximize value to shareholders. 
They may have many contractual and norm-based obligations elsewhere. 
And if the control were to be efficiently bought it would include the 
rights to remove those directors and poison pills. It is naïve to think that 
we can just put our thumb on one activity taken by market players and 
say that we make the market more efficient by preventing that activity 
when we do not even know what the market is and how broad it is. 
One might respond to our claim in general or in the context of take-
overs that the choices about governance are in some ways forced upon 
the founding entrepreneur, who had control and only gives it up by 
choosing to enter into a market relationship. But this does not change the 
analysis. Just as GM might spin off the division that makes engines (or 
find an outside supplier), an entrepreneur decides which parts of control 
will be produced internally and which will be produced in the market. Of 
course, the entrepreneur has some of the choice thrust upon him. A major 
auto manufacturer has no choice but to hire autoworkers and follow gov-
ernment regulations. But they do have some say in how other structures 
are configured. Once the control has been put out in the market, it is 
more difficult to restructure. The control rights would have to be reinte-
grated. That is what makes the market for corporate governance more 
complicated than the takeover literature of the 1980s suggests. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Our modest goal in this Essay is to suggest an alternative to the 
board-centric model of analyzing corporate governance. There is no team 
with a coach, only corporate governance players. Instead of a rigid hier-
archical system of corporate governance, we describe something more 
akin to a nimble, shape-shifting organism. It is important that we under-
stand the real sources of power in modern firms, as well as the potential 
that could be unlocked by freeing markets to provide a greater suite of 
governance options for firms. This Essay is a first step toward under-
standing barriers to innovation that exist in current law. 
With the foundational understanding that firms are run not by 
shareholders but by multiple stakeholders in complex relationships, it is 
time to dig deeper into how those relationships are structured—to identi-
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fy where stakeholders are parts of teams and where they sit on the out-
side—and how those characteristics effect the economic operation of the 
firm. It is our ultimate goal to identify a more systematic framework for 
doing so. 
 
